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DLD-155        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1128 
___________ 
 
SHELLY L. BRYANT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARK CHERNA, Director of Allegheny County Human Services; 
JOHN DOES, all in their Official and Individual Capacities 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-01272) 
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 14, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: March 28, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Shelly Bryant, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting Appellees‟ motion to dismiss his 
second amended complaint.  There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will 
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grant the Government‟s motion for summary action and affirm the decision of the District 
Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary for 
our discussion.  Bryant initially filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 
violations of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 862(a), and equal protection.  According to Bryant, the Allegheny County Court of Common 
Pleas—Family Division and its Domestic Relations Section opened a child support case 
without establishing paternity, which led to the entry of an order requiring Bryant to pay child 
support to the mother of his minor children.  The District Court granted Appellees‟ motion to 
dismiss Bryant‟s complaint but provided him leave to amend.  In an amended complaint, 
Bryant alleged violations of several criminal statutes and made various state tort claims.  The 
District Court granted Appellees‟ motion to dismiss and allowed Bryant a final opportunity to 
amend. 
 In Bryant‟s second amended complaint, he again alleged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 
862(a) and also alleged that Cherna violated various policies and procedures concerning 
paternity and child support enforcement.  According to Bryant, his due process and equal 
protection rights were violated through the enforcement of the child support order against him 
and the use of his tax refunds to cover child support arrears.  The District Court granted 
Appellees‟ motion to dismiss this final complaint.  Bryant timely filed this appeal. 
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II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court‟s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 
(3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may affirm the District Court on any basis 
supported by the record.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III. 
In his first complaint, Bryant brought suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
(Allegheny County Family Division).  However, the Eleventh Amendment protects a state or 
state agency from a § 1983 suit, unless the state has waived its own immunity, see MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 2001), and Pennsylvania has 
expressly withheld its consent to be sued.  See Lavia v. Pa. Dep‟t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 
(3d Cir. 2000); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
dismissed Bryant‟s first complaint. 
 In his amended complaint, Bryant brought suit against the Allegheny County Domestic 
Relations Section and the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.  The District Court 
believed that Bryant misnamed the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas—Family 
Division (hereinafter the “Family Division”) as the Domestic Relations Section.  The Family 
Division is an entity of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania and, as such, is an 
instrumentality of the Commonwealth.  See Pa. Const. art. V, § 1; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 102.  
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Furthermore, the state courts of Pennsylvania, including their domestic relations sections, are 
entitled to immunity from suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.  
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Accordingly, we agree that both the Family Division and the Domestic Relations Section are 
immune from suit. 
 We also agree that the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare was entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The Department is one of the many administrative agencies 
that perform the “„executive and administrative work of [the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.‟”  Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting 71 Pa. Stat. § 61).  Furthermore, the only allegation Bryant made against the 
Department of Welfare is that it violated 21 U.S.C. § 862(a), which provides sentencing courts 
with the discretion to make drug traffickers ineligible for federal benefits “for up to 5 years 
after such conviction.”  That statute provides no private right of action for use by a litigant 
such as Bryant.  See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002). 
 Bryant‟s second amended complaint named Marc Cherna, Director of Allegheny 
County Department of Human Services, and John Does as defendants.  The complaint again 
alleged a violation of 21 U.S.C. 862(a), violations of his due process and equal protection 
rights, and violations of the Social Security Act and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support 
Orders Act (“FFCCSOA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.  However, in Pennsylvania, each county‟s 
Domestic Relations Section has jurisdiction over child support matters; therefore, Cherna and 
the Department of Human Services would have had no involvement in Bryant‟s child support 
case, and Bryant has not sufficiently alleged any extraordinary involvement in his case by 
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Cherna or his department.
1
  See Rogers v. Bucks Cnty. Domestic Relations Section, 959 F.2d 
1268, 1271 n.4 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Pa. R. Civ. P. 1910.1-1910.4; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951-
52) (“The Courts of Common Pleas and their Domestic Relations Sections have jurisdiction 
over child support matters.”). 
The District Court did not err in declining to allow Bryant a further opportunity to 
amend his complaint, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002), 
as it had already provided Bryant two previous opportunities to amend.  If Bryant had further 
amended to include the director and employees of the Allegheny County Domestic Relations 
Section, they would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in their official capacities 
because, as discussed above, the county domestic relations sections are part of Pennsylvania‟s 
unified judicial system.  See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990); see also 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 961.  Any claims against these employees in their individual capacities for their 
roles in initiating and prosecuting child support proceedings would be barred by the doctrine of 
quasi-judicial immunity.  See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997). 
IV. 
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we grant the Government‟s 
motion and will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.  3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                              
1
 It appears that Bryant named Cherna as a defendant to again assert a violation of 21 U.S.C. 
862(a) for allowing his children‟s mother to receive public assistance despite her drug 
convictions.  As noted above, this statute does not provide him with a private right of action 
against Cherna.  See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 283-84.  Furthermore, with regard to Bryant‟s 
claim that his equal protection rights were violated because paternity was not established, he 
has failed to support his allegation with evidence that he was intentionally subjected to 
treatment different than that received by other similarly situated individuals.  See Phillips v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). 
